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This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in 
discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various 
commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family 
size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We 
then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 
4,  8  and  12  years  in  an  ordered  logistic  regression.  Whereas  we  establish  a 
robust  and  significant  link  between  patent  quality  and  value  in  samples  of 
discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents 
that  are  essential  to  technological  standards.  Consistently,  neither  the  quality 
factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. 
We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in 
discrete  innovation,  this  link  is  much  weaker  in  cumulative  innovation. 
Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  cumulativeness  affects  the  relationship  between 
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0  3 
Introduction 
 
Patents play an important role in modern economies, and especially in the growing sector of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). At the same time, especially in the ICT 
sector, the role played by patents is seen with increasing suspicion. While the number of ICT 
patents increases sharply, it is debated whether this increase in patents reflects an increase in 
innovation. It is a widely shared belief that an important share of the numerous ICT patents is 
of questionable quality and low commercial value. Furthermore, there is skepticism about the 
contribution of these numerous patents to technological progress in  ICT industries that is 
characterized  by  strongly  cumulative  innovation.  Many  scholars  raise  concerns  that 
cumulative innovation might be stifled in what develops to become a dense “patent thicket”. 
 
Patent  thickets  are  webs  of  overlapping  and  mutually  blocking  patents  held  by  different 
owners.  Mutually  blocking  patent  rights  result  from  cumulative  innovation,  where  no 
technological  component  can  be  marketed  individually  without  the  technological 
complements potentially protected by patent rights of different companies. Patent thickets 
have a clear impact on patent strategies, as they provide incentives to file blocking patents. 
Blocking patents are filed to force companies practicing an existing technology into licensing 
and profit sharing, rather than to develop a new activity on a production market. For many 
economists,  patent  thickets  weaken  the  patent  system  by  reducing  returns  on  significant 
innovations through patent inflation and litigation, while allowing “patent trolls” to earn much 
on patents of dubious technological significance. The core prediction of the patent thicket 
theory is thus that the link between patent quality and patent value erodes. If the link between 
the value of a patent and the significance of the underlying innovation is weakened, so is the 
capacity of the patent system to reward innovators for socially desirable innovation activity. 
We will therefore address the crucial issue of the link between patent quality and patent value 
with a special focus on those fields where innovation is most cumulative. 
 
Probably the most prominent sector characterized by cumulative innovation is ICT, and more 
particularly those markets shaped by standardization. Elsewhere, one of the main debates 
around  standardization  concerns  the  sharing  of  royalty  surplus  between  the  Intellectual 
Property  owners  of  cumulative  innovation  (Swanson  &  Baumol,  2005;  Salant,  2009). 
Standardization  is  a  common  feature  of  modern  ICT  industries  and  conditions  highly 
profitable markets such as mobile telephony, wireless communication, digital data processing 
and  consumer  electronics.  Standards  are  means  of  ensuring  compatibility  between 
technological  components.  Standardization  thus  locks  in  the  markets  into  technological 
options and ties complementary technologies together. Often, these technologies are protected 
by  essential patents. A  patent is said essential  for a standard if there is no possibility of 
implementing the standard without infringing upon the standard. Through standardization, 
these patents thus gain blocking power over the whole standard. Important cases of litigation, 
such as the  cases on the conduct of Qualcomm and Rambus, provide  evidence of strong 
disagreements  among  companies,  as  manufacturing  companies  claim  to  be  “held  up”  by 
owners of essential patents asking for disproportionate royalties. Competition law and the 
Intellectual Property rules of Standardization Organizations provide for a specific regime of 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Licensing Conditions, but industry participants disagree 
on whether this regime is efficient in yielding reasonable prices for licensing essential patents. 
 
Going  beyond  the  narrowly  defined,  yet  extremely  important,  technology  markets  around 
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classes in which technology is more cumulative. These attempts yielded a categorization of 
technology  classes  into  discrete  and  complex  technologies.  Even  though  the  concrete 
classification  varies  from  study  to  study,  ICT  technologies  are  consistently  classified  as 
complex technology field. These technologies are indeed characterized by high citation rates 
among patents, indicating stronger cumulativeness of research (Nagaokia, 2005), and a strong 
presence of mutually blocking patent rights (Von Graevenitz et al. 2009). In several empirical 
studies of the capacity of patent quality indicators to predict patent value, electronics and 
other “complex” technological fields have revealed a low link between quality indicators and 
value. Nevertheless, none of these studies has clearly established whether cumulativeness is 
driving this apparently lower link between indicators of patent quality and value. In particular, 
these studies do not tell whether the link is weaker because the link between quality and value 
is  weakened  or  because  the  indicators  are  themselves  less  informative  of  the  underlying 
concepts quality and value. It is an important contribution of the present study to disentangle 
these issues. Furthermore, we will analyze whether particularities of patents from “complex” 
technology classes are due to the cumulativeness of research by comparing random complex 
technology patents to patents that are essential to technological standard. 
 
We will therefore study three different samples of patents. The first sample is made of patents 
declared as essential to technological standards, and allows testing directly the characteristics 
of cumulative innovation. In order to analyze whether these effects are specific to essential 
patents or rather relate to the broader technological field, we compare our sample of essential 
patents with a control sample of sibling patents from the same technological classes as the 
essential patents. We make sure that this sample consists only of patents from technological 
fields identified as “complex” by the related literature. Finally, we introduce a third sample of 
patents with the same application years as our two other samples, but randomly drawn from 
patent  classes  that  are  clearly  identified  as  “discrete”  by  the  related  literature.  We  then 
compare the link between patent quality and value from sample to sample.  
 
This is the first study using a broad range of patent quality indicators to address this issue. All 
these indicators are observable characteristics of a patent - like the number of claims or the 
number of times a patent is cited by posterior patents - that are believed to be driven by patent 
quality. Even though any of these indicators is likely to be noisy, using compound indicators 
reduces  the  noise  and  increases  the  likelihood  of  capturing  the  significance  or  quality  of 
patents. Furthermore, we capture the value of patents by predicting the likelihood of renewal 
after 4, 8 and 12  years of patent terms and check the  robustness of our results by using 
litigation data as alternative measure of commercial value. 
 
We will in a first step analyze the validity of the quality indicators. Our analysis concentrates 
on six indicators of patent quality: forward citations, backward citations, number of claims, 
family  size,  and  originality  and  generality  indices.  Factor  analysis  will  reveal  that  in  all 
samples there are two rather than one common factor driving the data. We can identify a 
quality factor driven by forward citations, claims and family size that is consistent throughout 
the samples. These quality indicators have however a much stronger covariance in discrete 
than  in  complex  technology  patents.  A  second  factor,  which  we  identify  as  basicness  or 
fundamentality of the patent, is particularly important for complex technology patents and 
especially for essential patents. Nevertheless, this factor is irrelevant for predicting patent 
value.  
 
In a second step, we use the quality factor established through factor analysis to explain patent 





































0  5 
quality  indicators  in  complex  technologies,  both  the  quality  factor  and  single  indicators 
perform well for predicting patent value and litigation in this sample. By contrast, in the 
sample of essential patents, neither compound nor single indicators have any predictive power 
for explaining patent renewal or litigation. We can rule out that this lack of explanatory power 
is due to weakness of quality indicators. Indeed, the indicators are even less noisy for essential 
patents than for the other patents from complex technology classes. Rather, we conclude that 
there is no link between patent quality and patent value in strongly cumulative innovation as 
for instance in standardized technologies. Nevertheless, this finding is specific to the sample 
of essential patents and cannot be generalized to the relevant patent classes.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part I summarizes the literature and 
sketches the theoretical background of the analysis. Part II describes the data and discusses 
the construction of the samples. Part III summarizes the results of the factor analysis. In Part 
IV, we will describe how the quality factor performs in predicting patent value as measured 
through  patent  renewals.  Part  V  discusses  the  implications  of  our  results  for  policy  and 
research methodology.  
 
I. Theoretical background, literature review 
 
 
It is the aim of this part to provide an overview over the literature. In the first part, we will 
summarize the economic literature on patent indicators and the measurement of patent quality. 
In the second part, we will discuss results of the literature using these indicators to analyze the 
relationship between patent quality and patent value. In both parts we will focus particularly 
on  the  distinction  between  discrete  and  cumulative  innovation  and  between  discrete  and 
complex technology classes. 
 
I.1  Measuring patent quality and value: the literature on patent 
indicators 
 
There is a longstanding tradition in economic research to rely upon patent data to measure the 
output of innovative activity. Nevertheless, patents are very heterogeneous, as some patents 
are  very  important,  while  many  patents  are  never  used.  As  this  heterogeneity  of  patents 
reduces the significance of patent counts as measure of innovation output, empirical research 
routinely weights patent counts by indicators of the importance of the underlying technology. 
This  importance  of  the  underlying  technology  is  referred  to  as  patent  quality  and  could 
alternatively be defined as the size of the inventive step protected by the patent or as the 
relevance of the underlying technology for future use by follow-up innovators. This concept 
has also been referred to as social value of the patent, i.e. the value added by the protected 
technology independently of who appropriates this value.  
 
Various strategies exist to compare the quality of patents: the literature has used e.g. expert 
rankings, case studies, or survey analysis. Nevertheless, these strategies are not available for 
studies of broad technological sectors with a very high number of relevant patents. Therefore 
the economic literature systematically relies upon indicators of patent quality. Indicators are 
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The most commonly used indicators are the number of citations a patent receives by posterior 
patents (so-called forward citations), the number of claims, and the size of the patent family 
(i.e. the number of international patent files with the same priority patent) (Griliches, 1990). 
Other indicators of patent quality include the number of backward cites, i.e. the number of 
patents cited as prior art and the patent’s generality index (measuring the dispersion of prior 
art over technology classes) and originality index (measuring the dispersion of citing patents 
over technology classes). Table 1 summarizes the main indicators of patent quality used in the 
literature. 
 
Name of the Indicator  Description  Justification 
Forward cites  Number of citations received 
by posterior patents 
Indicates the relevance of the 
patent for further research 
Backward cites  Number of citations made to 
previous patents 
Indicates the extent to which 
the  patent  makes  use  of  the 
existing prior art 
Number of claims  The  number  of  priority 
claims made in the patent 
Indicates  the  breadth  of  the 
technology  claimed  by  the 
patent holder 
Family size  The  number  of  international 
patents  filed  for  the  same 
priority patent 
Indicates  that  a  patent  is 
important on an international 
scale,  and  that  its  holder  is 
willing  to  incur  high 
application costs 
Generality  Dispersion  of  cited  patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates  that  the  patent 
draws  from  various  sources, 
increases  the  likelihood  that 
the  patent  is  a  fundamental 
rather  then  incremental 
innovation 
Originality  Dispersion  of  citing  patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates  that  the  patent  has 
been  important  for  a  broad 
field of further research 
Table 1 : Patent quality indicators 
 
These indicators are often used indiscriminately in different sectors and to measure a vague 
and  little  defined  patent  quality.  However,  the  indicators  capture  at  best  heterogeneous 
phenomena associated with the patents’ quality. For example, the number of claims could 
indicate the breadth of a patent whereas forward cites measure technological significance for 
further research. These specific phenomena could be, according to the field and the aim of the 
study, more or less relevant for patent quality. Thus, these indicators may be, according to the 
sector, considered as more or less suited to a study of a specific situation. Consequently, 
assessing the performance of quality indicators is crucial.  
 
For instance, the performance of the forward cites indicator has been repeatedly assessed and 
confirmed. Trajtenberg (1990-1) shows on a sample of computed tomography patents that 
more highly cited patents contribute more to consumer and producer welfare, Harhoff et al. 
(1999) show that patent holders value higher those of their patents that receive more citations, 
and Giummo (2003) finds that patents more often cited are more likely to be licensed. It has 
furthermore been shown that patents cited more frequently are more likely to be litigated 
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Simcoe, 2008). In a different approach, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) carry through a 
factor analysis on four indicators of patent quality and identify a strong covariance with one 
single common factor capturing an important part of the variance in the data. They argue that 
patent “quality” is the only underlying factor that could be thought of to jointly affect the 
number of claims, forward and backward cites and the size of the families. They furthermore 
argue  that  using  a  common  underlying  factor  of  various  indicators  rather  than  a  single 
indicator allows reducing the noise and improves the capacities of indicators to approximate 
patent quality. 
 
Probably, the most important challenge to the general use of patent quality indicators is the 
heterogeneity of the patent population. The functions and the mechanisms of patents can vary 
very much according to external factors, such as the type of assignee, the grant year and 
especially the field of technology. It is important in our context to make sure that for instance 
cumulativeness does not affect the capacity of indicators to measure quality adequately. 
 
For several reasons the cumulativeness of a technology field could have an impact on the 
patent indicators of quality. For instance the density of the patent web in a complex industry 
mechanically affects the average number of citations. Independently of its quality, a patent 
will be cited more often if it covers a technological area where the propensity to patent is 
high. For the same reason, a patent in such a dense web will have to cite more previous art 
than a comparable patent in another field of the same technological sector. 
 
Also firm strategies in the context of complex innovation can bias the indicators. Köhler, 
Blind and Thumm (2010) find that patents disclosed as essential to technological standards 
have more claims. Indeed, the existence of overlapping patents could provide incentives to 
raise the number of claims, as increasing the number of claims increases the chances of the 
patent  to  be  relevant  to  future  developments  of  a  jointly  held  technology.  On  a  different 
stance,  overlapping  IP  in  complex  technologies  may  increase  firms’  incentives  to  file 
numerous patents for few innovations, thereby increasing the size of the families. 
 
The fact that all the indicators are driven upwards or downwards in a particular technological 
field does not impede that variance inside a sample of patents from this technological field 
indicates differences in patent quality. For instance, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) in 
their factor analysis of four indicators over samples of patents from different technological 
fields identify a quality factor that is consistent over technological differences. Nevertheless, 
the covariance captured by this factor is lower in electronics, and the relative weights of the 
different indicators included in the factor are different. These results could indicate that even 
though the indicators still evidence a common quality factor in “complex” technology classes, 
they yield less consistent results than in discrete technologies. 
 
We will thus test the consistency of our quality indicators throughout the samples before 
engaging into the econometric analysis of the link between patent quality and value. We want 
to make sure that differences in the link between patent quality indicators and patent value are 
not driven by the fact that the patent quality indicators perform differently well in indicating 
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I.2  The link between patent quality and value: cumulative vs. 
discrete innovation 
 
Economic research draws a clear distinction between the notion of patent quality and the 
commercial value of the patent (Trajtenberg 1990-2). There are several ways to calculate the 
value of a patent: most important examples are the depreciated sum of expected cash flows, 
the expected sales price of the patent, or the contribution of the patent to the market value of 
the owning firm. The concept of patent value takes into account only the value added of the 
patent for its owner.  
 
Many factors besides the quality or significance can determine a patent’s value. An important 
issue is the ability of the owner to appropriate the value generated by the patent (Trajtenberg 
Henderson & Jaffe, 1997). Even a technologically significant patent can be of low private 
value, when the owner is unable to appropriate the gains generated by the patent. In this case, 
the existence of externalities drives a divide between social and private value of the patent. 
Another possibility is that the owner of the patent does not have the capacities to practice the 
protected technology and market failures impede the sale of the patent at its real value. On the 
other hand even patents protecting only minor technological contributions can be of high 
value to their owner, if additionally to reaping the added value of the protected technology 
they allow leveraging on related innovations.  
 
Several ways how patents leverage on related innovations are studied in the literature. For 
instance  economists  have  come  to  acknowledge  the  importance  of  holding  large  patent 
portfolios. Indeed, each patent increases the value of the other patents held by the same patent 
owner,  as  patent  portfolios  shield  the  single  patents  from  invalidation  claims,  leverage 
negotiation power, attract subsequent investment in applied research and increase the patent 
holder’s say in patent politics and decision making (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005).  
 
Many arguments pointing to a divergence between patent quality and patent value relate to the 
cumulativeness of research. For instance, Liu, Arthurs, Cullen and Alexander (2008) find that 
patents relating to sequential innovation held by the same owner are more valuable. In other 
contexts, it has been found that cumulative innovation has an incidence on patent value also 
when  the  various  patents  are  held  by  different  owners.  For  instance,  a  patent  holder  can 
extract  substantial  royalties  from  conduct  known  as  patent  ambush  or  holdup.  These  are 
practices where a patent holder deceives potential licensees on the existence of his property 
rights or on the extent of his royalty claims until sunk investments are incurred. The incidence 
of real or perceived patent holdup has led to various policy efforts to provide a regulatory 
framework  for  licensing  patents  in  cumulative  technology,  most  notably  technological 
standards, as it is not clear that market mechanisms will yield prices that are in adequate 
proportion to the significance of the patent
3.  
 
An assumption underpinning these debates is that the link between patent quality and patent 
value is very important. If the returns on patents are disconnected from the technological 
contribution of the underlying innovation, the efficiency of the patent system as innovation 
                                                 
3  A  recent  example  is  the  drastically  extended  chapter  on  standardization  in  the  draft  guidelines  on  the 
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reward  is  at  stake.  An  increasing  strand  of  empirical  literature  has  thus  studied  the  link 
between  patent  quality  and  value.  Hall,  Jaffe  &  Trajtenberg  (2005)  and  Nagaoka  (2005) 
analyze the correlation between patent quality indicators and the market value of the patent 
owner,  and  Lanjouw  and  Schankerman  (1999)  and  Thomas  (1999)  analyze  the impact of 
patent quality on the probability that a patent is renewed. Consistently, all studies evidence a 
strong  link  between  quality  and  value,  but  there  is  also  evidence  for  strong  differences 
between technological fields.  
 
Lanjouw  and  Schankerman  (1999)  use  a  compound  factor  of  quality  indicators  (claims, 
forward  cites,  family  size  and  backward  cites)  to  predict  patent  litigation  and  renewal  as 
measure of private value. They emphasize a strong link between patents’ private value and 
indicators of quality; but this link is less obvious for the electronics sector. Hall et al. (2005) 
underline that the impact of patents weighted by citations on the estimation of firms’ market 
value differs according to the technological sectors. They especially highlight that the impact 
of patent citations on market value is over 50% higher for drugs than the average effect. This 
effect is lower for computers than that for the other sectors. They explain this difference by 
the opposition between complex and discrete technologies:  “Computers and Communications 
is a group of complex product industries where any particular product may rely on various 
technologies embodied in several patents held by different firms. In this industry patents are 
largely valued for negotiating cross-licensing agreements, so their individual quality is not as 
important, although having them is”. On the other hand, Nagaoka (2005) finds that patent 
quality measured by forward citations is more correlated with firm market value in ICT and 
other industries where innovation is cumulative.  
 
All these papers build upon the idea that technologies can be categorized into complex and 
discrete technologies, whereby complex technologies are characterized by a dominance of 
cumulative innovation and a strong incidence of patent thickets
4. This distinction originates in 
a paper of Levin & all. from 1987 and has by now been studied by an extensive body of 
research
5. This research has established that firm strategies with respect to patents differ from 
complex to discrete technologies (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000). In complex technologies, 
many firms use patents for other reasons than excluding their rivals from the use of their 
technology. Most notably, many firms active in complex technologies rely heavily on cross-
licensing agreements to cut their way through patent thickets
6 (Giuri, 2010) and engage into 
patent portfolio races (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Hereby patent portfolios play an important 
role as “mass of negotiation”. Thus, the way how patents create value could be different from 
discrete to complex technological fields. The value is no more derived from the right to use or 
to produce the technology but from the possibility to use the patent as a threat of exclusion 
and  mass  of  negotiation.  This  argument  is  particularly  relevant  to  specific  technological 
sectors such as telecommunications or semi-conductors. 
 
The  extant  literature  thus  draws  a  distinction  between  complex  and  discrete  technology 
classes  that  is  motivated  by  the  more  cumulative  nature  of  innovation  in  complex 
technologies. Nevertheless, as underlined by Robin Jacob, innovation is in general essentially 
                                                 
4 Harhoff and von Graevenitz (2009) 
5 Levin et al. (1987), Merges and Nelson (1990), Kusonoki, Nonaka and Nagata (1998), Cohen, Nelson and 
Walsh (2000) 
6 Patent thickets can be defined as: “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must 
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cumulative and it is therefore in the nature of the patent system to generate patent thickets
7. 
Furthermore, even though differences between technological classes are widely attributed to 
implications  of  more  or  less  cumulative  innovation,  there  is  so  far  no  empirical  analysis 
directly relating findings on the level of technological classes to the issue of cumulativeness.  
 
In this paper we will disentangle the effects of cumulativeness from the technological class a 
patent belongs to. In order to do that, we will compare a sample of (complex) patents declared 
as essential to technological standards with a control sample of patents from exactly the same 
(complex) technology classes. Indeed, standardization is a process applying to cumulative 
innovation, as it ensures compatibility between various technological components. Indeed, the 
impact of cumulativeness on the value of the patents is particularly strong for essential patents 
and  it  seems  particularly  difficult  to  establish  their  value.  This  is  evidenced  through  an 
extensive literature trying to establish a formula for measuring the value of essential patents 
and giving substance to the formula of Reasonable royalty rates inscribed into the rules of 
Standardization Organizations (Swanson & Baumol, 2005; Salant, 2009).  
 
We will thus directly address the question of the link between quality and value in cumulative 
and discrete innovation. We reproduce findings in the literature by comparing samples of 
complex and discrete technology patents. Introducing a sample of essential patents from the 
same technology classes as the sample of complex patents, we are able to analyze whether the 
differences  between  classes  are  effectively  due  to  implications  of  cumulative  innovation. 
Furthermore,  we  disentangle  effects  affecting  the  performance  of  indicators  from  effects 
affecting the link between quality and value. We now turn to a description of the construction 
of the database and provide descriptive statistics for the various samples. 
 
 
II.  Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
II.1  Construction of the samples and variables 
 
Our objective is to compare cumulative and discrete innovation on samples of complex and 
discrete technologies. As discussed, we introduced a third sample of standardized patents in 
order to highlight how our results are driven by implications of cumulativeness. 
  
As data are most constrained for standardized patents, we first constituted a database of US 
patents  that  are  essential  to technological  standards.  This  database  is  derived  from patent 
disclosures at 8 standard setting organizations (SSOs) collected by Rysman and Simcoe and 
from the websites of seven different patent pools (lists of SSOs and patent pools can be found 
in the appendix 3). It comprises overall 3343 essential patents, out of which 993 are part of a 
patent pool.  
 
By  merging  these  patent  lists  with  the  NBER  patent  database,  we  inform  the  technology 
classes of 3128 patents and verify that the patents in our database cover technology that is 
                                                 
7 Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Jacob (2008), “Patents and Pharmaceuticals – a Paper given on 29
th November at the 
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classified  as  “complex”  according  to  previous  literature
8.  The  concrete  classification  of 
technological sectors into complex or discrete technologies is still subject to debate. In our 
analysis, we will concentrate on clear cut cases of industries that are classified as complex or 
discrete according to several methodologies. Details on our selection of classes can be found 
in the annex 4. 
 
Based on the remaining patents, we construct a sample of siblings. These are US patents with 
the same application year and the same technology class randomly chosen from the NBER 
patent  database.  This  second  sample  is  what  we  will  call  in  the  following  the  group  of 
complex, non-standardized patents. 
 
Finally,  we  build  up  a  third  sample  of  discrete  patents.  These  are  patents  with  the  same 
application years as the patents in the other two samples, randomly chosen from a large range 
of  discrete  technology  classes  in  the  NBER  patent  database.  The  detailed,  three-digit 
technology classes of both the complex and the discrete patent samples can be consulted in 
the annex. 
 
Overall, we have 9255 patent observations. The NBER patent database yields information on 
citation  flows  and  other  important  variables.  We  inform  the  number  of  forward  cites 
(including and excluding self-cites), backward cites as well as the generality and originality 
indices, both building upon citation data. We furthermore retrieve the number of claims, the 
application  year  and  the  grant  year.  We  complete  this  information  on  patents  using  the 
website of the European Patent Office www.espacenet.com, where we retrieve the size of the 
patent families and indications on renewals. 
 
By merging the patent database with our own disclosure database, we obtain the concrete 
technological standard that 1.509 patents are essential to and the dates of disclosure. If one 
patent is disclosed as essential to several standards, we retain only the standard of the first 
disclosure. For every standard, we calculate the mean of the disclosure dates of all essential 
patents. For every patent, we generate an age_of_disclosure variable, defined as the difference 
between the disclosure date and the mean disclosure date for this particular standard. For the 
993 pool patents, we use an earlier database including an age_of_input variable, defined as 
the difference between the date of input of a given patent and the date of input of the first 
patent in the pool. Even though differently constructed, age_of_disclosure and age_of_input 
both  allow  studying  the  chronological  order  of  patents  that  are  essential  for  the  same 
technology.  
 
Finally,  using  the  Stanford  IP  litigation  database  (www.lexmachina.org),  we  generate  a 
dummy variable - litigated - which gives 1 if the patent has been cited in at least one law suit 
in the database. 
  
II.2  Descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we will use the comprehensive database to provide descriptive statistics on the 
predictions of the theory on cumulative innovation. The results in table 2 are consistent with 
many arguments drawn from the literature on cumulative innovation: indeed, in line with the 
hypothesis that the cumulative nature of innovation in complex industries drives up citation 
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rates, both backward and forward cite rates are significantly higher in the complex than in the 
non-complex random sample, whereas the scores for claims are not significantly different, 
and family size is much bigger in the discrete sample. Furthermore, we confirm previous 
findings that the litigation rate is indeed higher in complex than in discrete industries (1.4 
compared to 1 %). This could hint to the fact that patents are indeed used in a slightly more 
“litigious” way in complex industries, and corroborates the argument that patents generate 
value in a different way from complex to discrete technological fields. Furthermore, higher 
renewal rates on complex technology patents also provide evidence that less patents are of 
low value to their owners in complex technologies.   
 
Citation rates are even much higher in the sample of essential patents than among random 
complex technology patents. On the one hand, this could indicate that patents in this sample 
are even more cumulative than the average of their technological field. On the other hand, as 
these patents score high also on all the other quality indicators and on renewal and litigation 
rate, the high citation rate seems at least partly to be driven by a selection effect: essential 
patents are highly cited, because they are better than average patents from their technological 
field. In the remainder of the analysis, we will have to control for this selection effect, as we 
want to rule out that results that we attribute to cumulativeness result from selection. 
 
Furthermore, these descriptive statistics call for a cautious use of quality indicators when 
comparing the different samples. Consistently with the argument that claims are driven up in 
cumulative  innovation  in  order  to  maximize  the  chances  of  blocking  successive  research 
paths, we find the average number of claims to be higher for essential patents. Furthermore, 
family size is bigger on average in the sample of essential patents, which provides some 
support to the argument that numerous patents are filed on single inventions in order to inflate 
patent portfolios. Finally, as discussed, high citation rates among essential patents could result 
from the fact that these patents relate to technological fields where the general propensity to 
patent is high, which results in prior art protected by a higher number of patents. Before 
interpreting the indicator scores in terms of quality, we therefore turn to an extensive factor 






























Allnscites  23,35  42,76  8,58  15,42  20,93  36,66  40,15  57,86 
Backward 
cites  9,30  14,12  7,28  9,67  8,87  15,38  11,72  16,18 
Claims  16,85  15,09  15,19  14,07  15,77  12,92  19,66  17,54 
Family size  15,66  46,33  13,64  40,15  6,51  17,88  24,75  62,67 
Generality  0,35  0,37  0,22  0,34  0,39  0,37  0,43  0,35 
Originality  0,23  0,24  0,14  0,22  0,26  0,25  0,25  0,22 
Renewal at 8  0,73  0,44  0,59  0,49  0,73  0,44  0,95  0,21 
Renewal at 12  0,57  0,50  0,37  0,48  0,55  0,50  0,92  0,27 
Litigated   0,03  0,17  0,01  0,10  0,01  0,12  0,07  0,25 
 







































0  13 
III.   Are indicators consistent for different technologies: 
the principal factor analysis 
 
 
The aim of this part is to compare the stability of indicators among different technological 
sectors. In order to study the consistence of the indicators, we will use a factor analysis. 
Factor analysis is a way to describe variability among observed variables through a smaller 
number of underlying variables called factors. Factor analysis is concerned with the common 
covariance of the variables and estimates how much of the variability  is due to common 
factors.  
Thus, the factor analysis uses a large number of observations and reveals common patterns 
underlying the variables. For instance, factor analysis is a method regularly used in political 
sciences  to  highlight  the  unobserved  political  convictions  of  surveyed  people  using  their 
expressed opinion on various societal problems. In economics, factor analysis is used when 
capturing a common phenomenon is more interesting than analyzing individual variables. For 
example, it is a method used for a very long time to capture the growth phenomenon of a 
country
9. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) first used the principal factor analysis to identify 
an overall patent quality factor through four indicators.  
In  this  part  we  will  use  the  factor  analysis  for  our  three  samples:  discrete,  complex 
standardized  and  complex  non  standardized  technologies.  The  objective  is  to  study  the 
stability of the different indicators according to the technological sectors and see if a common 
pattern exists.  
 
We first run a factor on four indicators frequently used to assess the “quality” of a patent 
namely the number of forward cites, the number of claims, the number of backward cites and 
the family size of the patent. We only make the comparison for the discrete and complex 
samples in order to revisit precedent results on the subject (Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004)). 
Our results on this first factor analysis (presented in annex 1) are very closed to the previous 
results using the same method.  We highlight that the impact of forward cites on the common 
factor  1  is  more  important  for  non  complex  technologies  than  for  complex  technologies. 
Inversely,  the  impact  of  the  number  of  claims  is  more  important  in  the  case  of  complex 
technologies. We can also highlight that the common covariance explained by factor 1 is less 
important in the case of complex technologies.  
 
We then perform the same principal factor analysis using two new indicators: the originality  
and the generality of the patent. The generality and originality, measured by the number of 
forward or backward cites between the patent and patents from other technological classes, 
can get an idea of the patents’ interest for broader technological applications (Hall & all., 
2001).  We  run  this  factor  analysis  on  our  three  samples  to  compare  the  stability  of  the 
indicators  according  to  the  technological  sectors.  The  following  table  summarizes  the 




                                                 
9 For more information on applying these method to the data on a countrys’ growth, see Adelman I. and Taft 
Morris C., « A Factor Analysis of the Interrelationship Between Social and Political Variables and Per Capita 
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  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2 
Variance  0.48807  0.24936  0.26113  0.24636  0.47470  0.28419 
Forward 
cites 
0.4532  0.0021  0.3029  0.1377  0.2139  0.3903 
Backward 
cites 
0.3549  0.0762  0.4036  -0.0143  -0.0722  0.0685 
Claims  0.2383  -0.0049  0.4197  0.0469  0.0563  0.3745 
Originality   -0.0794  0.3629  -0.0286  0.3467  0.4441  0.0759 
Generality  0.0370  0.3662  0.1113  0.3276  0.3828  0.1426 
Family size  0.4174  -0.0950  0.2102  0.0289  -0.0677  0.1463 
Number of 
observations 
3139  3004  3191 
 
Table 3 : Loadings factor analysis six indicators 
 
Table 3 is useful to emphasize some conclusions on the stability of indicators. The first result 
is  that  there  are  two  main  factors  underlying  these  indicators.  A  first  factor  is  mainly 
correlated to the number of forward cites, claims and to some extent backward cites and 
family  size.  This  first  factor  has  already  been  discussed  in  the  literature  (Lanjouw  & 
Schankerman, 2004) and named “quality”. We will thus continue to call it this way. Table 
also stresses the existence of a second factor, having an important impact on the indicators 
common covariance, for both the complete and discrete samples. This second factor is mainly 
linked to the generality and the originality of the patent. For complex patents (as opposed to 
the discrete sample), this second factor also has significant loadings on the citation indicators. 
A plausible interpretation would be that this factor discriminates between fundamental and 
incremental  innovations;  which  could  be  the  reason  why  it  is  particularly  linked  to  the 
generality  and  originality  of  the  patent  but  also  with  the  number  of  cites  in  the  case  of 
complex technologies. According to the existing literature (Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe, 
1997), we will use the denomination “basicness factor”. For the complex standardized sample, 
this basicness factor significantly drives the common covariance of the indicators. It becomes 
the most important factor for this sample and the quality factor is overshadowed.  
 
In  spite  of  the  presence  of  a  second  factor  that  is  especially  important  in  samples  of 
cumulative  patents,  we  identify  a  quality  factor  that  is  roughly  consistent  throughout  the 
samples. In all three samples, the quality factor is driven by a positive correlation between 
forward cites, claims and family size. Nevertheless, the loadings of indicators are slightly 
different between complex and discrete technologies. The number of claims seems to have 
more impact than the number of forward cites on the quality factor for the complex sample. It 
is exactly the opposite in the case of discrete technologies, where the most important indicator 
is the number of forward cites. Another point on the loadings of the quality factor is the 
greater importance of the backward cites for the complex non standardized sample than for 
the discrete sample. This indicator is often considered as a way to assess the patent holder 
investment  in  the  patent  refinement.  It  could  thus  be  a  way  to  discriminate  in  complex 
technologies between patents resulting from less significant innovation effort. Therefore it is 
interesting to note that this indicator is strongly linked to the first factor “quality” in the case 
of complex non standardized technologies. For the complex standardized sample, the quality 
factor remains the same except for the backward cites. Indeed, backward citations play no role 
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mainly useful for screening out low quality patents. We are confident that in our sample of 
essential patents the share of low quality patents is far below average. 
Another  important  difference  is  the  variance  explained  by  the  quality  factor  between  the 
complex and discrete sample. Indeed, we can underline that this quality factor explains almost 
fifty  percent  of  the  covariance  of  the  indicators  for  the  discrete  sample.  However,  in  the 
complex  samples,  this  factor  only  explains  one  fourth  of  the  common  covariance  of  the 
indicators.  
 
For the basicness factor, we use data on the timing of declaration or introduction of patents 
into  standard  setting  organizations  and  patent  pools  to  corroborate  our  interpretation.  We 
created  two  new  variables,  founding  patent  pool,  which  equals  1  if  the  patent  is  a  pool 
founding patent and founding_patent_sso which equals 1 if the patent was disclosed before 
the average age of patent disclosure to the respective standard. These variables allow us to 
discriminate between fundamental and incremental innovations. The underlying assumption is 
that founding patents of a pool or a standardization project are more fundamental. We run a 
regression with the two variables founding patent pool and founding_patent_sso as explained 
variable and the factors highlighted in this section as the explanatory variables. The results are 
presented in table 6 (appendix 4). They show that both factors are related to being a founding 
patent. The results on the basicness factor stress that being a founding patent of a pool or a 
standardization project is significantly linked to a high score on the factor. This could confirm 
our  interpretation  that  this  factor  discriminates  between  fundamental  and  incremental 
innovations. The quality factor is also significantly associated with the likelihood of being a 
founding patent. This confirms that founding patents of a standardization process are of better 
quality than patents disclosed later in the process (see Baron & Delcamp, 2010). 
 
To sum up our main conclusions, we can say that the factor analysis underlines the existence 
of two factors driving the common covariance of the indicators. The first one, mainly linked 
to the traditional indicators of quality has already been studied in the literature. The second 
one is mainly driven by the generality and originality of the patent. We call it the basicness or 
fundamentality  factor  and  give  some  evidence  corroborating  our  interpretation.  For  the 
complex  standardized  sample,  this  basicness  factor  explains  almost  half  of  the  common 
covariance of the indicators.  The quality factor seems to remain stable (with some minor 
changes  on  claims  and  forward  cites)  across  our  three  different  samples  except  for  the 
importance of the backward cites. Indeed, the weight on this indicator on the quality factor is 
important and stable for both our discrete and complex non standardized sample but does not 
have any importance for the complex standardized sample.  
In the next section, we will look at the ability of these factors especially the quality one to 
predict the private value of the patent. In order to assess the private value of a patent, we will 
use data on renewals and litigations. To take into account the finding on the unstability of 
backward  cites  on  the  quality  factor,  we  will  use  a  common  quality  factor  compound  of 
forward cites, claims and family size.  
 
 
IV.  The link between patent quality and private value in 
discrete and cumulative innovation 
 
As discussed in part I, we expect that the link between indicators of patent quality and patent 
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technologies  where  innovation  is  in  general  thought  to  be  more  cumulative,  for  instance 
electronics  and  telecommunication.  Even  though  the  question  has  never  been  explicitly 
addressed, several arguments in the empirical literature point to a weaker link between patent 
quality and patent value in some classes identified as complex. We will test the theory of a 
significant difference as to the private value of patents and its link to patent quality between 
complex and discrete technology patents. Specifically, we will estimate the value of patents in 
an ordered logistic regression estimation of patent renewals. Comparing samples of complex 
and discrete technology patents, we will test whether the common patent quality factor is less 
explanatory of patent value in complex technologies. We also analyze  whether patents in 
complex technologies are more valuable than patents in discrete technologies of the same 
patent quality. 
 
Second,  we  test  more  directly  for  the  effects  of  cumulative  innovation  by  introducing  a 
sample  of  patents  declared  essential  to  technological  standards.  As  explained  above, 
standardization is a procedure to ensure compatibility between complementary technologies. 
It is therefore by definition part of a cumulative innovation effort. Standardization can also be 
analyzed as a strategy of firms to navigate through the patent thicket. Essential patents are 
those  patents  that  are  necessarily  infringed  by  any  implementation  of  the  standard.  The 
blocking potential of essential patents is therefore extended to the whole standard. We have 
thus argued that if cumulative innovation weakens the link between patent quality and patent 
value, this should clearly be seen in the case of essential patents. Therefore we test directly 
whether patent quality contributes less to patent value in the case of essential patents, and 
whether essential patents are more valuable than non-essential patents of the same quality. 
 
We thus estimate the following baseline equation:   
 
    (1) 
where V represents patent value, measured through   an  ordered  logistic  regression  of  the 
probability of patent renewal. Q represents patent quality, measured by the quality factor established in 
part III.1. X is a vector of control variables, including application year and assignee dummies. C is a 
constant and ε is a stochastic error term.  
 
We introduce dummies for complex technologies and essential patents. Both dummies are 




 Hypothesis 1: 
  >  0 and β' > 0, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovation, therefore 
patents in complex technologies (respectively essential patents) are more valuable than 
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Hypothesis 2: 




Ordered logistic regression 
renewals 





















































Control Application year  Y  Y 




Number of obs  1637  1637 
  
Wald chi2  260.31   258.76 
 
Prob > chi2  0.0000   0.0000 
 
Pseudo R2  0.0859   0.0870 
 
Table 4: The link between quality and value for cumulative and discrete innovation 
 
Table 4 allows underlining a couple of results. First of all, patent quality is an important part 
of the definition of patent value. The parameter for the quality_factor variable is positive and 
significant for our two models. The link between value and a compound factor of quality is 
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Hypothesis 1 is also verified, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovations. Thus 
patents  in  complex  technologies  (and  within  complex  technologies,  essential  patents)  are 
more valuable than patents of the same quality and presenting the same characteristics in 
discrete  technologies.  Hypothesis  2  is  verified  for  essential  patents,  the  parameter 
interaction_quality_standardized is negative and significant. Therefore, the quality takes a 
smaller share in the definition of patent value for cumulative innovation (i.e. the link between 
quality and value is less obvious for cumulative innovation). But hypothesis 2 is not verified 
for  the  overall  complex  sample.  Thus,  the  quality  factor  predicts  renewal  in  discrete  and 
complex, but not in standardized samples. We verify that this is not due to a selection effect. 
Indeed, one could argue that quality indicators are less informative of patent value in a sample 
of essential patents, as all these patents are selected and their quality  and value is above 
average.  Nevertheless,  we  control  for  selection  effects  by  excluding  all  patents  from  the 
analysis that have never been renewed, by restricting the samples to patents that have been 
litigated, by dropping all patents from the sample that that have a quality factor score above 
average, and by introducing the square of the quality factor as a control variable to control for 
non-linear effects. There is no evidence for non-linear effects of patent quality on patent value 
throughout the sample, and our results hold under all the different control strategies (The 
results are available upon request from the authors). As we can rule out that our results are 
driven by a selection effect, it is thus clearly cumulativeness that alters the way how patents 
generate value. Nevertheless, this cumulativeness is rather unrelated to technological classes, 
as random patents from exactly the same technology classes as the essential patents do not 
exhibit any weakened link between patent quality and value. 
Table 7 (appendix 5) allows refining the previous results. We run the same regression as in 
table 4 for each quality indicator individually. For model 1, we use in the same regression all 
the  quality  indicators  together  as  explanatory  variable.  The  parameters  therefore  allow 
assessing the indicators’ impact everything else equal. Model 2 reports the parameters for 
each  indicator  used  individually  as  explanatory  variable.  We  present  this  model  because 
indicators are more often used individually especially by policymakers or patent experts. In 
order to check the robustness to the way how we measure patent value, we also introduce 
patent litigation as an alternative indicator. 
Table 7 confirms that quality indicators, especially forward cites, claims and family size are 
good predictors of patent value (measured by litigation or renewal) for discrete and complex 
non-standardized technologies.  The number of claims works well for predicting the value of 
complex  non-standardized  patents  but  not  for  discrete  technologies.  This  confirms  our 
previous  results  on  the  difference  in  the  quality  factor  between  complex  and  discrete 
technologies:  the  number  of  claims  becomes  more  informative  than  the  forward  cites  for 
complex technologies. The main result is that no indicator works for predicting the patent 
value  for  complex  standardized  technologies.  This  is  in  line  with  our  hypothesis  that 
cumulativeness disrupts the link between quality and value. The most important difference is 
not between complex and discrete technological classes, but within complex technologies.  
 
V.  Implications for policy and research methodology 
 
We have demonstrated a very significant and robust relationship between patent quality and 
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innovation,  as  demonstrated  using  a  sample  of  patents  declared  essential  to  technological 
standards.  While  these  patents  are  clearly  better  on  average  and  more  valuable  than  the 
control patents, quality plays no role for explaining differences in patent value inside the 
sample. 
The lesson to be drawn from this insight is twofold: on the one hand, our findings allow 
revisiting the patent portfolio theory for cumulative innovation. As to the portfolio theory, 
patents are valuable as such, independently of their quality or any other measurable patent 
characteristics.  This  has  strong  implications  for  patent  filing  incentives  and  innovation 
strategies. The primary determinant of patent value is the capacity of blocking other patents. 
We have shown in our empirical work that patents with blocking power over a standard are 
much more valuable than other patents in the same technological field of comparable quality. 
Furthermore,  among  these  essential  patents  with  blocking  power  over  a  standard,  patent 
quality is no longer a determinant of patent value. Therefore, patent holders have incentives 
not to pursue patent quality, as long as they can achieve blocking power over the standard. 
This  finding  provides  support  to  those  who  see  the  surge  in  essential  patents  with  some 
worries. However, we also showed that essential patents are still much better in terms of any 
quality indicator than control patents, so that we can conclude that the selection mechanism at 
work during standardization is not defunct.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that the link between patent quality and value is quite 
robust over technology classes. This means that while cumulative innovation alters the way 
how patents generate value in relatively narrow, highly cumulative sectors identified through 
formal standardization, this does not affect the relevant technology classes as a whole. Indeed, 
our  sample  of  complex  technology  patents  drawn  from  exactly  the  same  classes  as  the 
essential patents does not exhibit a weakened link between patent quality and value. This 
suggests that the effects of cumulative innovation are important only in narrow yet highly 
relevant technological fields. 
This latter finding is important for appreciating the implications for research methodology. 
Indeed, we find no evidence that patent quality indicators are less informative in complex than 
in discrete technological classes. Patent quality predicts renewal decisions and litigation even 
more accurately in our sample of (randomly chosen) complex technology patents. Comparing 
single indicator, we confirm previous findings that claims are a more informative indicator 
than forward citations when studying complex technologies. 
In turn, the indicators behave very differently in the sample of essential patents. First, none of 
the studied indicators predicts patent renewals or litigation with any accuracy. We conclude 
that it is erroneous to use indicators of patent quality such as forward citations or claims to 
approximate the value of essential patents. Second, the indicators seem to be mainly driven by 
an underlying factor that is different from patent “quality” or importance. We have interpreted 
this factor as “basicness” of the patent and highlighted some evidence for this interpretation. 
We thus find that observable patent characteristics are not informative of patent value in the 
case  of  cumulative  innovation  and  that  the  characteristics  of  these  patents  are  driven  by 
factors that are orthogonal to patent quality or significance. This is bad news, as it implies that 
indicators of patent quality or importance function the worse where the industry most needs 
them.  Indeed, pooling of patents, cross licensing schemes and other clearing mechanisms 
widely practiced for highly relevant cumulative innovations are dependent upon objective and 
clear  criteria  for  establishing  royalty  sharing  rates.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  at  least  the 
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The factor analysis of four indicators  
 
 
The following table summarizes the results of a principal factor analysis of the four main 




  Discrete technologies  Complex technologies 
Variance  0.52903  0.07807  0.31715  0.23077   
allnscites  0.4456  0.1267  0.3053  0.1541 
cmade  0.3543  0.1614  0.2875  0.3087 
claims  0.2311  0.1825  0.3462  0.1783 
familysize  0.3893  0.0518  0.1464    0.2827 
Number of observations  3139  3004 
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Appendix 2 
 
List non complex technology classes 
 
 
19  Textiles:  Fiber Preparation 
26  Textiles: Cloth Finishing 
28  Textiles:  Manufacturing 
29  Metal Working 
38  Textiles:  Ironing or Smoothing 
44  Fuel and Related Compositions 
57  Textiles:  Spinning, Twisting, and Twining 
66  Textiles:  Knitting 
68  Textiles:  Fluid Treating Apparatus 
71  Chemistry: Fertilizers 
75 
Specialized Metallurgical Processes, Compositions for Use Therein, Consolidated Metal 
Powder Compositions, and Loose Metal Particulate Mixtures 
76  Metal Tools and Implements, Making 
87  Textiles: Braiding, Netting, and Lace Making 
99  Foods and Beverages: Apparatus 
100  Presses   
101  Printing   
135  Tent, Canopy, Umbrella, or Cane 
139  Textiles:  Weaving 
148  Metal Treatment 
162  Paper Making and Fiber Liberation 
164  Metal Founding 
228  Metal Fusion Bonding 
229  Envelopes, Wrappers, and Paperboard Boxes 
423  Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds 
424  Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
429  Chemistry:  Electrical Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and Process 
435  Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology 
436  Chemistry: Analytical and Immunological Testing 
514  Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
518  Chemistry:  Fischer-Tropsch Processes; or Purification or Recovery of Products Thereof 
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￿  1394 
￿  DVD 6C 
￿  MPEG 2 
￿  MPEG 4 Systems 
￿  MPEG 4 Visual 
￿  AVC  









￿  American National Standard Institute 
￿  Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards 
￿  European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
￿  Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
￿   Internet Engineering Task Force,  
￿  International Organization for Standards International Electrotechnical Commission 
￿  International Telecommunications Union  






























































Probit  Founding patent SSO  Founding patent pool 
Fundamentality factor 
 






















Number of obs  2601  369 
Wald chi2(22)  217.33  86.89 
Prob > chi2  0  0 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard erros in parentheses 
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Appendix 5 
  Discrete technologies  Complex non standardized technologies  Standardized Technologies 












Renewed at 8 











































































































































































































































































legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard erros in parentheses 
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